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RELIGIOUS REFUSAL: ENDANGERING PREGNANT
WOMEN AND PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS
Stephane P. Fabus*

There has recently been an upsurge in the attention paid to
women’s health issues and the viewpoints are often fiercely contested.
One area has long been a hot spot for contention, the infamous “A”
word—abortion. Where an individual or institution lands on the issue
is often rooted deeply in religious, philosophical, and moral beliefs.
Legislatures have tried to protect healthcare providers' personal beliefs
by passing conscience clauses. As these clauses have expanded to
include both individual and institutional providers, they appear to pose
a real danger to the health of women suffering emergent medical
conditions relating to pregnancy. Informed consent and medical
standards of care may be in conflict with a provider’s personal beliefs or
the institution's policies, but such providers are protected from liability
under conscience clauses when they violate these medical and legal
principles based on their beliefs. In these instances, patients are left
with no legal recourse when their care is negatively impacted. Catholic
institutions in particular must follow the Catholic Church’s Ethical
and Religious Directives, without regard to what the individual
provider or patient thinks is the best course of treatment. Health care,
* Stephane Fabus, J.D. 2012, Marquette University Law School, B.A.
2009, Marquette University, practices health law in Milwaukee,
Wisconsin.
My seven years at Marquette University were the most inspiring
and influential years of my life to date. I wish to extend sincerest
gratitude to the faculty and students of Marquette University Law
School who helped me to develop the tools and skills necessary to
successfully pursue my passion of a career in health law. Cura
personalis. I would also like to thank my parents who have always
supported me, encouraging me to be well-informed and to never fear
expressing my opinion.
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however, has become a highly regulated industry, catering to people of
all religions, philosophies, and moralities. The First Amendment can
only reach so far, and where the line has been crossed into state action,
even a religious corporation cannot violate the Constitution for the sake
of enforcing religious principles.
This article explores the impact of the Catholic Ethical and
Religious Directives (“ERDs”) on medical treatment and
decision-making in Catholic-affiliated hospitals in the United
States. Its scope is restricted to the narrow issue of the treatment
of emergent conditions in pregnant women, such as ectopic
pregnancy, severe pulmonary hypertension, and miscarriage,
where there is no chance of continued fetal life but extreme risk
to the health and life of the mother. Its focus is on the harm
caused by institutional, rather than individual, religious refusal
to provide emergency abortion services. Specifically, this article
discusses the inability of medical professionals working in
Catholic-affiliated hospitals to follow standards of care in such
cases because of the stringent interpretation of the ERDs. In
these cases, transfer to a more accommodating hospital may not
be possible; federal law prohibits hospital transfers when they
increase the risk to the health and life of the patient. The quality
of medical care in these situations is being compromised due to
the conflict between policies imposed by the ERDs on providers
and providers’ attempts to comply with medical and legal
standards of care. This tension endangers the lives of pregnant
women who have these types of emergent conditions. The legal
protection offered by conscience clauses exacerbates the issue by
providing healthcare providers, both individually and
institutionally, a right to elevate their beliefs above such medical
and legal standards.
The first section of this article discusses recent cases
motivating this author’s investigation into this narrow issue,
gives a description of the ERDs, and presents an overview of the
current presence of Catholic hospitals in the health care
industry. The second part discusses the medical risks to mothers
that result from strict interpretation of the ERDs, the
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professional standards medical providers breach in conforming
to the requirements of the ERDs, and the likelihood that such
acts might disqualify hospitals from public funding. It also
discusses the vast protection offered by “conscience clauses” at
the state and federal level, which limits the enforcement of
current medical ethics, standards of medical practice, and legal
standards such as medical malpractice and informed consent.
The final section addresses constitutional issues surrounding the
ERDs, such as the constitutional validity of conscience clauses
generally under the First Amendment. Further it discusses how
such clauses may be unconstitutional as applied under a state
action theory recognizing Catholic-affiliated hospitals as state
actors who, in enforcing the ERDs, infringe on the individual
constitutional rights of patients. This article adds to the
academic landscape a narrowly tailored argument that the best
approach to protecting pregnant women suffering from lifethreatening conditions is to view Catholic healthcare institutions
as quasi-public actors who cannot deny treatment based on
religious refusal.
I. BACKGROUND AND STATISTICAL OVERVIEW
In November 2009, a 27-year-old mother of four presented to the
emergency room at St. Joseph’s Hospital, a Catholic hospital in
Phoenix, Arizona.1 She was eleven weeks pregnant with her
fifth child and suffering from severe pulmonary hypertension, a
condition that threatened her life.2 There was no way to save the
fetus, and without an immediate abortion the mother would die
as well.3 The hospital’s ethics board convened and determined
that, despite hospital policy, the mother should be advised of
1. Becky Garrison, Playing Catholic Politics with U.S. Healthcare, THE GUARDIAN
(Dec. 31, 2010), http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/belief/2010/dec/31/
catholic-us-healthcare-abortion.
2. Molly M. Ginty, Treatment Denied, MS. MAGAZINE BLOG (May 9, 2011),
http://msmagazine.com/blog/blog/2011/05/09/treatment-denied.
3. Catholic-Secular Hospital Mergers, PBS (Mar. 25, 2011), ttp://www.pbs.org/
wnet/religionandethics/episodes/march-25-2011/catholic-secular-hospital-mergers/
8431 [hereinafter PBS] (video and transcript).
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her option to have an abortion and one could be performed, if
the mother chose to have the procedure.4 Almost immediately,
the local bishop, charged with interpretation and enforcement of
the ERDs, excommunicated Sister Margaret McBride, a member
of the hospital ethics board who had approved the abortion, and
stripped the hospital of its 116-year-long Catholic affiliation.5
Bishop Olmstead stated in support of his decision: “In this
case, the baby was healthy and there were no problems with the
pregnancy. Rather, the mother had a disease that needed to be
treated. But instead of treating the disease, St. Joseph’s medical
staff and ethics committee decided that the healthy eleven-weekold baby should be directly killed.”6 Under the ERDs, an
abortion is "the directly intended termination of pregnancy
before viability or the directly intended destruction of a viable
fetus," and is never permissible,7 not even to save the life of the
mother.
This is not the first instance where Catholic policy has
interfered with a pregnant woman’s treatment of an emergent
condition. When Kathleen Prieskorn felt fluid running down
her leg and realized she was miscarrying for the second time,
she rushed to her doctor’s office in Manchester, New Hampshire
and was informed her amniotic sac had torn.8 Unfortunately,
because his affiliated hospital had recently merged with a
Catholic hospital and her doctor could still detect a fetal
heartbeat, he was prohibited from performing a uterine
evacuation there.9 The nearest hospital that would perform the
procedure was eighty miles away, but Prieskorn had no car and
could not afford the expensive ambulance ride.10 Complications
during the miscarriage posed potential risks including loss of
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ginty, supra note 2.
Id.; PBS, supra note 3.
PBS, supra note 3.
UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 26 (5th ed.2009)
(Directive No. 45).
8. Ginty, supra note 2.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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her uterus or even death.11 To get her the necessary treatment,
her doctor gave her $400 of his own cash and put her in a taxi to
the distant hospital.12
Judy Hummel, another pregnant woman, presented to a
Catholic hospital and was diagnosed as suffering blood
poisoning due to a uterine infection.13 She miscarried, delivering
a stillborn fetus.14 However, when her placenta did not appear,
the doctor realized she had actually been carrying twins.15 The
doctor, in line with his and the hospital’s Catholic beliefs, did
not inform Hummel of her option to have an abortion even
though her uterine infection steadily grew more severe to the
point of endangering her life. While the second baby eventually
was born alive, she weighed just over one pound, was in
extreme distress, and would suffer severe permanent physical
disability and mental retardation.16 The Hummels sued the
hospital and the doctor on behalf of their daughter claiming they
departed from standard medical practice by failing to inform
Mrs. Hummel of the option of abortion or transfer to another
facility that would allow the procedure. At the time, the court
agreed,17 however under expanding conscience clause
protections discussed in Part II, infra, many similarly situated
plaintiffs’ claims might not survive today.
The narratives above demonstrate ways in which strict
interpretation and enforcement of the ERDs’ prohibition on
abortion may compromise treatment of pregnant women with
emergent conditions in Catholic hospitals and those secular
hospitals that merge with Catholic providers and contractually
agree to abide by the ERDs.18 The ERDs present “the theological
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Brietta R. Clark, When Free Exercise Exemptions Undermine Religious Liberty
and the Liberty of Conscience: A Case Study of the Catholic Hospital Conflict, 83 OR. L.
REV. 625, 642 (2003).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 643.
18. Katherine A. White, Crisis of Conscience: Reconciling Religious Health Care
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principles that guide the Church’s vision of health care.”19 They
have a dual purpose: (1) “to reaffirm the ethical standards of
behavior in health care that flow from the Church’s teaching
about the dignity of the human person;" and (2) “to provide
authoritative guidance on certain moral issues that face Catholic
health care today.”20 They are interpreted and enforced by the
United State Conference of Catholic Bishops “in the light of
authoritative church teaching.”21
The ERDs are divided into six parts addressing different
areas of health care practice, with each part divided into two
subparts.
The first subpart is expository, providing an
introduction and a context for discussion.22 The second subpart,
however, is prescriptive and issues the Directives, which are
intended to govern practice in Catholic-affiliated health care
institutions “to promote and protect the truths of the Catholic
faith.”23 For purposes of this article, the focus is on certain
Directives contained in Part 4 covering “Issues in Care for the
Beginning of Life,”24 specifically Directives 45, 47, and 48.
Directive 45 is the primary Directive governing abortion
and virtually eliminates the possibility of ever performing an
abortion in a Catholic hospital, without regard to considerations
such as the viability of the fetus or health and life of the mother.
It states:
Abortion (that is, the directly intended termination of
pregnancy before viability or the directly intended
destruction of a viable fetus) is never permitted. Every
procedure whose sole immediate effect is the
termination of pregnancy before viability is an
abortion, which, in its moral context, includes the
interval between conception and implantation of the
embryo. Catholic health care institutions are not to
provide abortion services, even based upon the
Providers’ Beliefs and Patients’ Rights, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1703, 1738 (1999).
19. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 7, at 3.
20. Id. at 4.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 23–28.
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principle of material cooperation. In this context,
Catholic health care institutions need to be concerned
about the danger of scandal in any association with
abortion providers.25
Based on the strict interpretation of the principles of
material cooperation and scandal, Directive 45 limits a
provider’s ability to inform a patient of abortion as a treatment
option and the ability to transfer the patient to another facility
willing to provide an abortion.26
Directive 47 allows for “operations, treatments, and
medications that have as their direct purpose the cure of a
proportionately serious pathological condition of a pregnant
woman” even if they will result in fetal death, so long as they
cannot be safely postponed until the fetus is viable.27 These
types of procedures have been referred to as “indirect
abortions.”28 However, Directive 48 states that, “[i]n case of
extrauterine pregnancy, no intervention is morally licit which
constitutes a direct abortion.”29 Under the bishops’ new stricter
interpretation of the ERDs, what essentially constitutes a direct
abortion is not permitted for “treatment” purposes and cannot
be framed as an indirect abortion intending to treat a
proportionately serious pathological condition threatening the
health or life of the mother.30
To understand the potential impact of this strict
interpretation of the ERDs on pregnant women with emergent
conditions, one must first grasp the broad presence of Catholic
and Catholic-affiliated hospitals in the United States healthcare

25. Id. at 26.
26. Martha S. Swartz, “Conscience Clauses” or “Unconscionable Clauses”: Personal
Beliefs Versus Professional Responsibilities, 6 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 269,
290–91 (2006).
27. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 7, at 26.
28. William W. Bassett, Private Religious Hospitals: Limitations Upon Autonomous
Moral Choices in Reproductive Medicine, 17 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 455, 503
(2001).
29. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, supra note 7, at 27.
30. See letter from Thomas J. Olmstead, Bishop of Phoenix, to Lloyd H. Dean,
President of Catholic Healthcare West (Nov. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.azcentral.com/ic/community/pdf/bishopletter.pdf.
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marketplace. Catholic hospitals contain 20% of the hospital beds
in the United States.31 With over 600 hospitals nationwide,32
Catholic-affiliated institutions are the leading non-profit
providers of health services in the U.S. and run 18% of
hospitals.33 Seven of the ten largest non-profit hospitals are
Catholic, as are five of the ten largest provider networks.34
Further, in 1998 ninety-one Catholic hospitals were certified as
sole providers, a number that encompassed a 65% increase over
the previous three years.35 The presence of Catholic governance
in health care has been exacerbated in recent years with the
increase of mergers that allow Catholic hospitals to impose the
ERDs and the bishops’ interpretation of them on secular
facilities.36 Catholic entities are involved in a majority of the
healthcare mergers in the United States,37 with 171 mergers
occurring between 1990 and 2001.38
The potential impact on pregnant women with emergent
conditions is also not as slight as it may at first seem.
Miscarriage occurs in 10–20% of pregnancies.39 There are a
multitude of complications that can arise and potentially become
life threatening as the miscarriage progresses.40
Ectopic
pregnancy is the leading killer of first trimester mothers.41 The
small percentage of abortions performed in hospitals are usually
performed out of necessity for women who are medically fragile

31. Swartz, supra note 26, at 331.
32. Susan B. Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Religious Beliefs and Healthcare
Necessities: Can They Coexist?, 30-SPG HUM. RTS. 8, 8 (2003).
33. Swartz, supra note 26, at 331.
34. Id.
35. Susan R. Fogel & Lourdes A. Rivera, Saving Roe is Not Enough: When Religion
Controls Healthcare, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 725, 734 (2004).
36. See Tena Jamison, Should God Be Practicing Medicine?, 22-SUM HUM. RTS. 10,
10 (1995).
37. Clark, supra note 13, at 639.
38. Swartz, supra note 26, at 331.
39. Below the Radar: Health Care Providers’ Religious Refusals Can Endanger
Pregnant Women’s Lives and Health, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Jan. 20, 2011), available
at http://www.nwlc.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/nwlcbelowtheradar2011.pdf [hereinafter Below the Radar].
40. Id.
41. Id.
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or at risk for serious complications and who require the medical
back-up systems a hospital can provide.42 Further, women
suffering these conditions and needing an abortion to protect
their health or life may already have difficulty obtaining
treatment. As of 2000, 87% of counties in the United States had
no abortion provider and one-third of American women resided
in these counties.43 If the nearest provider for these women
refuses to perform the procedure, she might have to travel fifty
miles or more to get to the next nearest provider who will
perform the procedure.44 This problem has the potential to
severely impact women’s health in the reproductive arena
especially in the case of emergency complications.
II. THE ERDS’ NEGATIVE IMPACT ON MEDICAL AND LEGAL
STANDARDS OF CARE AND THE PROTECTION OF
CONSCIENCE CLAUSES
Strict enforcement of the ERDs can negatively impact the quality
of care provided to pregnant women with emergent conditions
as well as violate their legal and medical rights. The expanding
protection offered to Catholic hospitals and physicians through
state and federal conscience clauses may shield providers from
liability for their actions simply because those actions conform to
a religious, moral, or ethical belief system. While such actions
may have initially disqualified providers from participation in
government funding programs, the conscience clauses protect
Catholic providers from this consequence. Conscience clauses
thereby restrict the ways in which the government and
individual pregnant women can enforce their rights.

42. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 735.
43. Swartz, supra note 26, at 332–33. As this article goes to print, a Federal judge
is deciding the fate of the last abortion clinic in the state of Mississippi. The clinic is
being shut down based on a newly passed state law that requires Mississippi
abortion providers "be certified obstetrician/gynecologists with privileges at local
hospitals." Rich Phillips, Federal judge to determine fate of Mississippi's last abortion
clinic, CNN, (Jul. 11, 2012), http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/11/us/mississippi-abortionclinic-hearing/index.html.
44. Id. at 333.
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The ERDs often conflict directly with medical guidelines
and, with increased expansion in the size and influence of
Catholic hospitals, the ERDs may impede patient access to
comprehensive health services.45 They may also impede patient
access to information.46 Decreased access to services and
information negatively impacts patient autonomy and may be
medical malpractice.
One article has discussed the multitude of ways in which
the effects of strict enforcement of the ERDs can harm both
patients and society as a whole. Morrison and Allekotte state
that the types of harm inflicted by religious refusals can include
physical, emotional, financial, public, and legal harm.47 Physical
harm includes the serious health consequences a woman may
suffer when a necessary medical procedure is either not
provided or its provision is delayed because of a religious
refusal.48 The loss of a pregnancy naturally causes emotional
harm. However, this harm can be exacerbated by a refusal,
which implies an external judgment “that these women are
doing something wrong and invoke shame during a fragile
time.”49 Refusals further “reduce efficiency in healthcare” and
“impose additional costs because of insurance limitations,”
causing financial harm to the patient individually and increasing
the costs of healthcare and insurance for the general public.50
Refusals also harm the public by “reinforc[ing] and
perpetuat[ing] the idea that medical professionals are morally
judging the behaviors of their patients.”51 This can make
patients less forthcoming with their doctors or cause them to

45. Kimberly A. Parr, Beyond Politics: A Social and Cultural History of Federal
Healthcare Conscience Protections, 35 AM. J. L. & MED. 620, 637 (2009).
46. Jill Morrison & Micole Allekotte, Duty First: Towards Patient-Centered Care
and Limitations on the Right To Refuse for Moral, Religious or Ethical Reasons, 9 AVE
MARIA L. REV. 141, 148–49 (2010).
47. Id. at 149–62.
48. Id. at 150.
49. Id. at 155.
50. Id. at 157–58.
51. Id. at 160.
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avoid the healthcare system completely.52
Refusals also threaten medical and legal standards of care
and restrict patient autonomy. For example, under the informed
consent doctrine the patient has the right to be presented with
the full range of treatment options and have the risks and
benefits of each treatment thoroughly explained before selecting
a treatment plan.53 Informed consent is a medical and legal
standard of care, meaning providers can be held liable for failing
to meet its requirements.54 Informed consent is intended to
protect patient autonomy by ensuring the patient has all
information necessary to make a decision regarding medical
treatment.55 Providers governed by the ERDs, however, may not
inform a patient of all possible treatment options, or may give
inaccurate or misleading information to sway patient decisionmaking.56 Regarding emergency abortions, some religious
hospitals “forbid employees from providing information or
counseling about abortion [or] referring patients to other
facilities for abortions.”57
Further, the medical standard of care may be violated
where refusal of treatment is commanded by the ERDs. The
medical profession establishes its own acceptable standards of
competence and professional ethics.58 These standards become
the legal standard in medical malpractice cases, which require
that the provider act with the same “‘degree of skill and care
ordinarily possessed by a reasonable and prudent physician in
the same medical specialty acting under the same or similar
circumstances.’”59 Unfortunately for patients, the religious
52. Id. at 160–61.
53. Id. at 161.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 148–49, 161–62. Also Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 6–7; Fogel &
Rivera, supra not 35, at 728.
57. Steph Sterling & Jessica L. Waters, Beyond Religious Refusals: The Case for
Protecting Health Care Workers’ Provision of Abortion Care, 34 HARV. J. L. & GENDER
463, 465 (2011).
58. Swartz, supra note 26, at 342.
59. Id. (quoting Eric M. Levine, A New Predicament for Physicians: The Concept of
Medical Futility, the Physician’s Obligation to Render Inappropriate Treatment, and the
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principles controlling the availability of services can conflict
with accepted medical standards of care.60
In the cases of ectopic pregnancy and miscarriage, delay in
treatment falls below the standard of care and threatens the life
and health of the mother. There are four treatment methods for
an ectopic pregnancy: to administer “a single shot of a drug,
methotrexate, which dissolves the embryo; to surgically remove
the embryo while keeping the fallopian tube intact . . .; to
remove the entire section of the fallopian tube containing the
embryo; or ‘expectant management,’ which postpones all
treatment to observe how the condition evolves.”61 Catholic
hospitals governed by the ERDs view the use of methotrexate or
surgical removal of the embryo as direct abortion.62 These
providers will not perform either treatment even where
indicated as the standard of care or best practice based on the
patient’s condition.63 These procedures may be the only means
of preserving future fertility, however they are not an option in a
Catholic hospital following a strict interpretation of the ERDs.64
One study found that in order to comply with the ERDs,
treatment of ectopic pregnancy was delayed by unnecessary
tests.65 One provider stated such delay caused the patients’
tubes to rupture, threatening the mothers’ health and lives.66
Further, the standard of care for patients suffering an emergency
miscarriage at risk for complications is an immediate surgical
uterine evacuation.67 Some Catholic hospitals that refuse to
perform the procedure may transfer the woman elsewhere or
delay treatment until the fetal heartbeat has stopped, putting the
woman at risk for unnecessary blood transfusions, infection,

Interplay of the Medical Standard of Care, 9 J. L. & HEALTH 69, 101 (1994-1995)).
60. Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 727.
61. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 5.
62. Id. Also Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 46, at 152–53.
63. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 5.
64. Id. Also Morrison & Allekotte, supra note 46, at 153.
65. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 5.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 4.
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hysterectomy, or death.68 Conformity with the requirements of
the ERDs in these instances breaches the medical standard of
care and places the providers in a position where they could be
liable for medical malpractice. Most providers in these instances
are protected from this consequence by conscience clauses
discussed later in this section.
Further, health care providers have a special duty to treat
pregnant women presenting to emergency rooms with serious
conditions under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (“EMTALA”). EMTALA requires that hospitals
“provide stabilizing treatment to patients with emergency
medical conditions who seek care at emergency rooms,” and
treatment of severe symptoms must occur immediately; the
hospital is not permitted to wait until the patient’s condition
jeopardizes her health.69 EMTALA also prohibits hospitals from
transferring unstable patients to another hospital when those
patients, within reasonable medical certainty, will experience a
material deterioration of their condition during transfer.70
EMTALA does not contain an exception for providers who are
unwilling to provide care due to their religious objections.71
Providers who delay treatment or transfer a woman who
presents to an emergency room with severe pregnancy
complications rendering her condition unstable are in direct
violation of this federal law.
Catholic hospitals may jeopardize their government
funding when they refuse to provide the information necessary
to obtain informed consent, fail to provide the standard of care
in their treatment of pregnant women with emergent conditions,
or transfer or delay care of such patients in violation of
EMTALA. The Medicare Conditions for Participation require
that providers receiving Medicare funding obtain informed

68. Id.
69. Id. at 10; Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc
and 1395dd.
70. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 10; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395cc and 1395dd.
71. Below the Radar, supra note 39, at 10.
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consent, respect patient autonomy in decision-making,72 treat
patients in accordance with medically accepted standards of
care, and abide by federal and state laws related to patient
health and safety, such as EMTALA.73 Hospitals that do not
comply with these conditions can be deemed ineligible for
Medicare funding. Conscience clauses, however, are protecting
providers from this consequence as well.
Enforcement of the above-mentioned medical and legal
standards, whether individually through use of the courts in
medical malpractice cases or governmentally through
restrictions on public funding, is becoming increasingly difficult
as conscience clauses expand protections of religious providers
against liability.
A conscience clause is a legislative provision that allows an
individual or institutional provider to claim exemption from
compliance with a legal standard or requirement, usually based
on religious freedom grounds.74 These clauses exist at both the
state and federal level. Forty-seven states and the District of
Columbia have at least one conscience clause, and of these only
three states and the District of Columbia have an emergency
exception requiring the provider to provide services in an
emergency despite religious objection.75 Further, twenty-seven
of these states shift the responsibility for injury resulting from a
religious refusal to the patient by shielding the provider from
liability.76
Since their emergence in the 1970s, federal conscience
clauses have steadily expanded funding and liability protections
for providers. After the landmark decision in Roe v. Wade,
Congress enacted the first federal conscience clause, the Church
Amendment, in 1973.77 It “prohibited a court or public official
72.
(2010).
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Hospital Conditions of Participation: Patients’ Rights, 42 C.F.R. § 482.13(b)
See § 482.11(a) (2010).
Parr, supra note 45, at 622.
Id.
Id.
Fogel & Rivera, supra note 32, at 10.
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from using certain federal funds to require any individual or
institution to perform or assist in performing abortions or
sterilization procedures, if doing so would violate the
individual’s or institution’s religious or moral beliefs.”78 In 1997,
Congress extended protections to cover Medicaid and Medicare
managed care plans.79 The Hyde-Weldon Amendment, enacted
in 2004, further required that “federal funds be [] disbursed only
to federal agencies that honor so-called conscience clauses; as a
condition of federal funding, agencies must allow the
institutions, insurers, health care facilities, and individual health
care providers that they fund to refuse to provide, pay for,
provide coverage for, or refer for abortions.”80 The HydeWeldon Amendment is drafted so broadly that the refusal need
not be based on religious or moral beliefs, but for any reason
whatsoever.81 It does not contain an emergency clause82 and
allows providers to refuse to even inform patients of the
availability of such procedures,83 in violation of informed
consent standards.
As a result of expanding conscience clause protections at
both the state and federal level, pregnant women may not have
legal recourse through medical malpractice actions for violations
of informed consent or medical standards of care. Further, the
government may be unable to enforce laws such as EMTALA
and the Medicare Conditions of Participation through
restrictions on funding. With religious providers reaping the
benefit of such vast protections from liability, they are free to set
their own standards of practice and care based on religious
beliefs even though such standards may threaten the health of
pregnant women suffering from emergent conditions.
This danger could be averted if conscience clauses are
found generally to be constitutionally invalid or if hospitals are
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Swartz, supra note 26, at 280.
Id. at 283.
Id. at 274.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 333–34.
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viewed as state actors who cannot infringe on patients’
constitutional rights.
III. CONSCIENCE CLAUSES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSIDERATIONS
Due to state and federal legislatures’ support and increasing
expansion of conscience clauses in recent years, it appears that
patients may only be able to seek protection of their autonomy,
rights, and health from the Constitution. Conscience clauses
may be challenged generally under the First Amendment’s
establishment and free exercise clauses, but such challenges
would likely prove unsuccessful. A better route would be to
challenge the conscience clauses as applied to hospitals. Due to
the development of the healthcare marketplace, courts are
becoming more likely to find institutional healthcare providers
to be quasi-public institutions that, as state actors, cannot
infringe on patients’ constitutionally protected rights. In these
cases, conscience clauses are unconstitutional as applied to
hospitals.
The First Amendment states in pertinent part: “Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”84 This breaks down into
the establishment and the free exercise clauses, both of which
have their own line of United States Supreme Court precedent
and are intended to address concerns regarding the
entanglement of church and state.85
The establishment clause protects the separation of church
and state by prohibiting the government from privileging one
religion over another or religion over non-religion.86 Announced
by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman and its progeny, the
test for the validity of a statute challenged under the
establishment clause requires that a statute have “‘a secular

84. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
85. Parr, supra note 45, at 625.
86. Id.
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legislative purpose,’ that its principal or primary effect neither
advance nor inhibit religion, and that it not foster an ‘excessive
entanglement with religion.’”87 Courts may inquire into whether
a certain religion is singled out for benefits under the statute,
whether it applies equally to religious and secular groups, or
whether the statute imposes an undue burden on nonbeneficiaries.88 A statute’s mention of religion or incidental
benefit to religion will not automatically be grounds for finding
an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.89
The Supreme Court has “warned that absolute
accommodations for religion are constitutionally intolerable”
and violate the establishment clause where they “provide[] no
exceptions and fail[] to give any consideration to the burdens
placed on . . . nonbeneficiaries.” 90 Burdens to non-beneficiary
patients as outlined above would support a finding that the
absolute accommodation to religious providers without
informed consent or emergency exceptions is unconstitutional
under the establishment clause.91 However, First Amendment
protection under the establishment clause is only available
where a statute preferences religion.92 Because conscience
clauses now almost uniformly offer protection to a broad range
of personal beliefs—be they religious, moral, or ethical—it
would be difficult to show that the clauses afford preferential
treatment to a particular religion, or religion generally over nonreligion.93 They do not single out religion for special treatment
or endorse particular religious beliefs, but allow secular beliefs
to also qualify for protection.94 Though unlikely, if a court were

87. Id. at 626 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612, 613 (1971)). Also
White, supra note 18, at 1730.
88. Maxine M. Harrington, The Ever-Expanding Health Care Conscience Clause: the
Quest for Immunity in the Struggle Between Professional Duties and Moral Beliefs, 34
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 779, 828 (2007).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 829.
91. See Parr, supra note 45, at 628.
92. Harrington, supra note 88, at 829.
93. Id. at 828, 829.
94. See id. at 829.
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to find that the statutes were intended to protect primarily
beliefs arising out of religious tenets, they could be viewed as
endorsing religion, even while also benefiting secular beliefs.95
Under this interpretation, conscience clauses would be
unconstitutional under the First Amendment’s establishment
clause by endorsing or giving preferential treatment to religion,
or for offering an absolute accommodation to religious belief or
behavior.
The free exercise clause protects the separation of church
and state by prohibiting laws that overly inhibit the free exercise
of religion, protecting both religious belief and religiously
motivated conduct.96 The United States Supreme Court in
Employment Division v. Smith and its progeny has established
that where a law is valid, neutral, and generally applicable it will
not violate the free exercise prohibition by having the incidental
effect of burdening religious action.97 Most conscience clauses
will survive a free exercise challenge because, as discussed
above, they are phrased in such a way as to meet the valid,
neutral and generally applicable standard by covering both
religious and secular refusals. Further, because the free exercise
clause targets discrimination against or burdens on religion by
government action, conscience clauses that by their nature
benefit religion may fall outside free exercise scrutiny.98
However, the Smith holding cuts both directions because it
extended only a qualified protection to religiously-motivated
conduct. An individual or institution's freedom to perform
religiously motivated conduct can be overridden by state
interests in protecting against the potential harm or burden such
conduct imposes on others.99 Religious refusals by providers are
religiously motivated conduct. Therefore, a state interest in the
health or welfare of pregnant women with emergent conditions

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 830.
Clark, supra note 13, at 628. Also, Parr, supra note 45, at 627.
Parr, supra note 45, at 627.
Id. Also Harrington, supra note 88, at 790.
Clark, supra note 13, at 650. Also, Harrington, supra note 88, at 789.
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would be sufficient to override free exercise protection and
support laws requiring the inclusion of emergency exceptions in
conscience clauses. At least one commentator has stated that the
government may have a compelling interest not only in ensuring
medically necessary services but also in helping to counter
gender discrimination in health care.100 Gender discrimination
arises because conscience clauses primarily impact female
reproductive health care services. Laws mandating emergency
exceptions in conscience clauses could help to combat the harm
of religious refusals because post-Smith these laws would likely
survive a First Amendment free exercise challenge.101
The best way to successfully challenge conscience clauses is
to claim that they are unconstitutional as applied under a state
action theory. A state actor is a person or institution that is
acting under the color of state law and therefore cannot act in a
way that violates an individual’s civil rights.102 Based on the
evolution of healthcare institutions, the modern religiously
affiliated healthcare provider may be more likely to qualify as a
state actor than in the past. If Catholic hospitals are found to be
state actors, they could not seek conscience clause protection if
enforcing the ERDs infringes on patients’ constitutional rights.
Courts have generally been unsympathetic to institutional
refusals, demonstrated by their willingness to characterize
hospitals as public or quasi-public institutions.103 The Church
Amendment was enacted partly in response to Taylor v. St.
Vincent’s Hospital,104 in which the court held that a Catholic
hospital, found to be a state actor based on the substantial
amount of government funding it received, violated the
plaintiff’s due process rights by refusing to perform a
sterilization.
Shortly after the enactment of the Church
Amendment, the Fourth Circuit decided Doe v. Charleston Area

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Swartz, supra note 26, at 329.
Clark, supra note 13, at 655–61.
See Swartz, supra note 26, at 298.
Id. at 297–98.
369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff’d 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Medical Center.105 In Doe,106 a suit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
the plaintiff claimed a nonprofit private hospital acting under
the color of state law violated her constitutional rights when it
refused to perform an elective abortion.107 The court determined
the receipt of construction funds under the Hill Burton Act was a
sufficient nexus to find the hospital was a state actor.108
Other courts followed suit. In 1976, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association109 held
that several private, nonprofit, secular hospitals were quasipublic institutions. This categorization was based on evidence
that the hospitals were “organized to serve the public, received
substantial financial support from federal and local governments
and the public, benefited from tax exemptions, were available to
the public, and because their properties were ‘devoted to a use
in which the public has and are subject to control for the
common good.’”110 As state actors, the hospitals could not
refuse to permit first trimester abortions under a state refusal
statute because it would be state action in violation of the federal
constitutional right to a first trimester abortion.111 The Alaska
Supreme Court in Valley Hospital Association v. Mat-Su Coalition
for Choice112 also found a hospital to be a quasi-public institution
and held the hospital could not abridge a patient’s right to a
constitutional abortion because “it had a special relationship
with the state through the state’s Certificate of Need program,
received construction funds from state, local, and federal
governments, and also received a significant portion of its
operating funds from governmental sources.”113 Further, the

105. Id. at 298.
106. 529 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1975).
107. Swartz, supra note 26, at 298.
108. Id.
109. 366 A.2d 641 (N.J. 1976).
110. Id. at 299 (quoting Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association, 366 A.2d 641, 645
(N.J. 1976)).
111. Id.
112. 948 P.2d 963 (Alaska 1997).
113. Id. at 299–300.
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New Jersey Supreme Court in Hummel v. Reiss114 intimated,
based on the duty to obtain informed consent, that “conscience
clauses may not protect a religious hospital from liability for
failure to inform a patient of otherwise generally acceptable
medical practices,” even if those practices run contrary to the
hospital’s religious policies.115
While the state actor cases following the Church
Amendment considered only secular hospitals, the courts’
analyses could easily be applied to Catholic hospitals. Take for
example the California Superior Court’s conclusion in Catholic
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court116 that the narrowlyinterpreted term “religious employer” in a conscience clause did
not exempt a Catholic charitable corporation “(1) for which the
inculcation of religious values is not the purpose of the entity; (2)
which serves people of all faiths; (3) which employs mainly nonCatholics; (4) which offers social services to the general public;
and (5) which benefits from a federal tax exemption.”117
Originally, religiously affiliated hospitals were small,
locally-owned institutions built by sectarian philanthropy and
financed by non-governmental sources to perform religious
ministries and serve, almost primarily, their own religious
members.118 Modern Catholic hospitals have had to alter the
way they do business to survive in the highly regulated and
ever-changing health care industry, and are now often difficult
to distinguish from their secular counterparts.119
Catholic hospitals are quasi-public institutions that qualify
as state actors for the same reasons as the private secular
hospitals in the cases above. Like secular hospitals, Catholic
hospitals appear to be primarily government-funded. In 1998,
combined Medicare and Medicaid funding accounted for nearly
114. 608 A.2d 1341 (1992) (discussed at n. 13, infra).
115. Bassett, supra note 28, at 558.
116. 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004)
117. Swartz, supra note 26, at 301.
118. See Bassett, supra note 28, at 461
119. Id. at 461, 545, 558. Also Kathleen M. Boozang, Deciding the Fate of Religious
Hospitals in the Emerging Health Care Market, 31 Hous. L. Rev. 1429, 1432 (1995).
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half of revenues in religiously affiliated hospitals; the other half
came from third-party payors and non-patient sources.120 This
percentage of governmental funding appears to have stayed
consistent since 1989.121 Surprisingly, almost no funding for
such hospitals comes from the religious entities with which they
are affiliated.122 Further, Catholic hospitals hire and elect to their
boards of directors members of the general public who often do
not share their religious beliefs, and they are organized to treat
members of the general public regardless of religious leaning.123
As the number of mergers increase, even a hospital’s name
is no longer a reliable indicator of religious affiliation.124
Consequently, prospective patients can recognize hospitals as
religiously affiliated “only with great difficulty and after careful
investigation.”125 Even the United States Supreme Court has put
Catholic health care providers in a different class than other
Catholic ministries, holding in Bradfield v. Roberts126 that “churchrelated hospitals are public benefit corporations, unlike churches
themselves, which are primarily religious in character,” and they
“fulfill a primarily secular purpose in serving the needs of
society.”127 Due to the secularization of Catholic hospitals, they
should be held to the same constitutional standards as their
secular counterparts. They are state actors that violate the
Constitution when they infringe on patients’ constitutionally
protected rights by refusing to perform procedures based on
religious convictions.
CONCLUSION
Pregnant women suffering from emergent conditions should be
able to count on medical treatment that conforms to legal and
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 742-43.
See White, supra note 18, at 1730.
Fogel & Rivera, supra note 35, at 743.
Basset, supra note 28, at 545, 548, 551.
Id. at 547.
Id. at 485.
175 U.S. 291 (1899).
Basset, supra note 28, at 547, 548. Also, White, supra note 18, at 1731.
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medical standards of care. In Catholic hospitals governed by the
ERDs, the threat to patient health and safety is exacerbated by a
refusal to perform life-saving abortions when complications in
pregnancy arise. The ability to protect patient autonomy and
enforce legal and ethical standards of care is steadily being
limited by the expansion of state and federal conscience clauses
that protect Catholic providers from liability.
To counter this effect, the expansion of conscience
protection must be curtailed. This limitation is best attained
through a constitutional analysis that recognizes religious
hospitals as state actors, reducing their ability to seek conscience
clause protection for actions motivated by religious policies
when such actions infringe on patients’ constitutional rights.
In the alternative, the First Amendment would permit a
requirement that healthcare providers give patients all the
information necessary to meet the informed consent standard,
regardless of a provider’s religious objection. Additionally, laws
could be enacted requiring that all conscience clauses include an
emergency exception. Mandating that necessary services be
performed during a medical emergency could provide some
protection to pregnant women suffering emergent conditions
without running afoul of the First Amendment’s establishment
and free exercise clauses.

